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Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to offer a conceptualisation of banks as global corporations.  The 
main challenge in such a task is to see beyond the silos of main academic disciplines that 
traditionally examine banks and banking, and recognise that organisationally and 
functionally, modern banking operates under complex governance structures. These involve 
national and international regulations and norms, private industry standards (such as 
accounting and reporting standards), rules of compliance, registration, licensing and 
insurance provisions. Today, a typical multinational enterprise, banks included, consists of 
legally independent corporate entities, each licensed to operate within a specified territorial 
realm, that are linked to each other’s legal entities in other countries (or even their own) 
through economic connections. This organisational and governance complexity is not easily 
accommodated within traditional academic approaches to finance and banking.  
There appears to be a lack of a dedicated academic tradition of analysing banks and 
other financial institutions and distinct entities.  In economics for instance, any enterprise – 
financial and non-financial - is typically understood as a firm, defined as an entity that ‘uses 
inputs to make output’ (Sloman et el. 2013: 4), a notion that abstracts away from legal, 
institutional, political and cultural specificities of modern economies. In political science  - a 
discipline that inquiries into the origins of power and influence – banks too, tend to be 
equated with other non-financial businesses, and are examined on the basis of their political  
power and influence over decision-making (Pagliari  2014; Pagliari and Young 2015). Legal 
scholars describe the phenomenon of the corporation broadly, focusing on the underlying 
property relations and debating the nature and the personality of the corporation. The latter, in 
turn, can be understood as either an agglomeration of individuals and hence a natural result of 
private initiative; or as an artificial creation of state law that has a separate existence from its 
shareholders and management (Millon 1990: 201).  None of these divergent disciplinary 
approaches to banking recognises the specific features of banking, as unique business 
enterprise, and which endows financial institutions with unprecedented structural power in 
our societies. Yet partly as a reflection of such specificities, the corporate character of global 
banks proves extremely difficult to pin down. 
The record of the evolution of banking and financial institutions, as witnessed most 
recently during the crisis of 2007-09, demonstrates that banking and finance is are far from 
being a neutral segment of the economy. Contrary to the assumptions of much of the legal 
scholarship, banks are neither the linear agglomeration of private interests, nor mere 
constructs of state laws. They are better seen, we argue in this chapter, as complex ecologies 
of financial and legal innovation, whereby multi-jurisdictional, multi-cell organizational 
complexity of banking are used to increase opacity in the financial system (Awrey 2013).  
This complex web of operational niches, professional and legal frameworks and communities 
governing the daily work of financial institutions suggests that banks operate not as discreet 
economic units, but more like biological ecologies that contain at times, hundreds or 
thousands of differentiated entities that are grouped up in a loosely related set of activities. 
Goldman Sachs Group incorporated, for instance, consists of 3,115 corporate entities of 
which 1,670 are non -US based; JP Morgan Chase is a conglomerate of 3,391 entities 
including four commercial banks (Avraham, et al., 2012).  
While the crisis of 2007-09 has highlighted the problems of opacity in finance by 
partly, focusing on the phenomenon of shadow banking, the post-crisis debate on banking 
regulations has tended, on the whole, to discuss ‘global banks’ as unified entities, glossing 
over the legal nuances of the differences between economic control and legal incorporation. 
At the same time the history of banking over the past three or four decades shows that banks 
and other financial entities have exploited their diverging legal status to their advantage. It is 
well established that many companies organise their affairs internationally through a host of 
holding companies and subsidiaries, in order to avoid or ‘optimise’ taxation. The same 
principle also plays an important role in the evolution of banking organisations as they have 
continually sought to avoid regulations and oversight. It is notable in this respect that global 
banks are not considered to be one legal entity subject to international law (McConnachie, 
2009). 
The question we raise in this chapter is whether conceptual confusion and 
terminological slippages between such concepts  ‘banks,’ ‘banking organisations’, ‘banking 
groups’, ‘bank holding companies’, ‘firms’ are mere curiosities, or whether they are of 
analytical and theoretical importance. We believe they are the latter. In what follows, we 
inquire into the conceptual implications of such complexity. 
What is a Bank? 
What is a ‘bank’ or more broadly, what exactly is a ‘financial institution’? Historically, rules 
and regulations governing banking institutions have evolved within the broad spectrum of 
commercial law (Berle 2012 [1938]). In legislative acts and processes, banks are treated as 
corporate legal personalities, not being distinguished from other types of corporate entities. 
Economists habitually treat ‘banks,’ ‘insurance companies’ or ‘hedge funds’ as unitary 
corporate entities. Yet this approach encounters problems the moment theory is put into 
practice. Let us take an extract from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) document 
laying the technical ground rules for the international accord on banking regulation (also 
known as the Basle accord
i
 or Basle rules on banking regulation). It is a rather typical 
example, we believe, of how the unitary concept of ‘bank’ begins to unravel once the nitty-
gritty of data collection or regulatory governance are being discussed. We quote:  
‘[t]here is considerable variation in how banks structure their capital planning 
processes. At some banks, the various responsibilities associated with capital planning 
are divided along functional lines. For example, experts assigned to a business unit 
have responsibility for establishing capital targets and managing their business in 
relation to them. Those estimates are aggregated to arrive at a firm-wide view of 
capital adequacy. Other banks rely on a more centralised model. In this model, a 
central group develops assumptions to be used firm-wide and has the authority and 
responsibility to review and challenge the estimates produced by individual areas of 
the bank’ (BIS 2014, 2).  
 
The document is vague about the very nature of those entities that the organisation is 
supposed to study and regulate. It begins by referring to ‘banks’ as ‘banking organisations’, it 
then introduces the concept of the bank as a ‘firm’ that takes on a ‘firm-wide’ perspective of 
its activities. The document then identifies more specifically ‘business units’ and/or ‘central 
groups’ within banks that devise the bank’s or ‘firm’s business planning.   
More worryingly, the BIS notes that some banks have adopted what it believes are 
‘sound capital planning processes.’ These are described as ‘formal processes in place to 
identify situations where competing assumptions are made’ (BIS 2014, 3). The BIS alleges, 
in other words, that banks (or ‘firms’ or ‘business units’) often follow internally competing 
assumptions about the nature of capital and/or planning. The BIS defines ‘well governed 
banks’ as not necessarily those that adopt a single set of criteria or assumptions about the 
nature of their capital planning, but those that at least have developed formal processes of 
adjudication among the different assumptions made about planning. By implication, one 
learns that many ‘banks’ - those that are not governed well -  do not even have such 
processes, and may adopt a range of competing assumptions and/or organisations and 
logistical techniques within the same ‘bank’ as their business model. Can any of these banks 
be considered a unitary entity? 
The law does not make the situation any clearer. US code recognises a banking 
association called ‘national banks’. Point 7 of U.S. Code §24 defines clearly what such 
association can and cannot do. 
‘To exercise by its board of directors or duly authorized officers or agents, subject to 
law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of 
banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, 
and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, 
coin, and bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, 
and circulating notes according to the provisions of title 62 of the Revised Statutes.’  




US law defines various limitations on the business of dealing with securities and stocks by 
the association, and other limitations. A brief look into the history of American financial 
regulation is useful in this instance. It has become a convention in academic debate to view 
the evolution of global banking as driven by the policies of economic and financial 
deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s, led primarily by the USA. Yet a closer reading of the 
rules and regulations of American national banks reveals that the majority are still operating 
under the 1935 Banking Act (known as the ‘New Deal’ regulations), and specify various 
obligations to different U.S. regulatory authorities.
ii
 While originally Glass Steagall defined 
an area of (insured) commercial banking, prohibiting commercial banks from engaging in 
(non-insured) securities trade, it was the nuances of interpretations of the Act that would lay 
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the foundation for the progressive erosion of barriers between various financial institutions 
and ultimately, facilitate the emergence of the shadow banking system. For instance, Kregel 
(2010) notes, Section 16 of the Act awarded regulated banks ‘all such incidental powers… 
necessary for the business of banking” (Federal Reserve Board cited in Kregel 2010).  
Interpretations of these terms in turn, would over time prove very diverse, requiring the 
regulators to allow for more and more exceptions to the rule.   As Kregel explains, 
‘Most of the exceptions that enabled commercial banks to meet the competition from 
noninsured banks and led to the progressive erosion of Glass-Steagall came in later 
interpretations of the ‘incidental powers’. The overal impact of these rulings ‘was the 
compelete reversal of the orginal intention of preventing banks from dealing in 
securities on their own account. The rulings laid the basis for the creation of properity 
trading desks by banks for their own account, as well as derivatives dealing and the 
provision of structured derivatives lending – both of which led to the rapid growth of 
the OTC market in credit deirvatves. The justifucation was to provide regulated 
institutions a level playing field with investment banks” (Kregel 2010: 11-12).   
 
Crucially, Glass-Steagall bypassed the issue of the fundamental reform and conflicting 
relantioship between state and national charters and regulation (Papadimitriou  2010: 3) – a 
problem that serves as a hurdle to regulation and control to this day.  
 Does it mean that all ‘American’ banks are ‘national banks?’ and are therefore subject 
to all those statutory regulations? Not really. Goldman Sachs explains on its K-10 form 
submitted to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that it is not a 
bank but a ‘bank holding company’ (BHC) (established under the rules of the Bank Holding 
Company Act BHC of 1956), and a financial holding company (established under the 
amendment to the bank Holding Company, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999). In other 
words, like multinationals, ‘Goldman Sachs’ consists of many legal entities some of which 
are regulated by the Federal Reserve Board, while others are not. In fact, most of the large 
household name banks are not ‘national banks’ but ‘bank holding companies’. While there is 
by now considerable literature discussing differences in the governance structure of these 
BHC (Adams & Mehran, 2003), the regulatory implications of such divergences among 
banking entities is not entirely clear.  
In the UK context the meaning of the term ‘bank’ is even more complicated. 
Historically, McConnachie (McConnachie, 2009) argues, the best description of a bank is 
offered in the English common law. In United Dominions Trust v Kirkwood (2)
iii
 Lord 
Denning of the Court of Appeal describes what makes up a bank by trying to define the 
essence of the task of the banker. ‘The Court of Appeal defined 3 elements for determining 
whether or not a person is a banker: 1 - The nature of the banking services provided; 2 - The 
importance of these services in relation to the business as a whole; 3 - The reputation of the 
institution.’ (McConnachie, 2009)’. Otherwise, ‘[t]here was an absolute prohibition on the 
accepting of deposits by a person in the course of carrying on a deposit-taking business, 
unless that person was an “authorised institution” in the words of the Act as per se 67(2). 
Authorisation could be revoked or restricted and the Bank had powers of investigation.’ 
(McConnachie, 2009). Current UK legislation has adapted the same principles to the new 
regulatory context. In the Banking Act of 2009, a UK bank is defined as a UK institution 
which has permission under Part 4 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to carry 
on the regulated activity of accepting deposits.
iv
 
In academic terms, it is notable that banks are defined partly by the activities of the 
‘banker’ – a concept that is often associated with the idea of ‘narrow’ or ‘boring’ banking 
whose age has come to an end around late 1970s- early 1980s (Augar 2008). The 
developments that have transformed banking and financial industry in the second half of the 
20
th
 century have blurred the lines between banks as deposit-accepting institutions, banks as 
market dealers, banks as investors and bankers as proprietary traders. Not only has the 
institution of ‘universal banking’ engulfed a variety of bank activities under one roof, but 
many other, non-banking financial intermediaries today can perform banking functions with, 
for instance, many former building societies now accepting customer deposits. In this regard, 
one is reminded of the prescient words of the then Chair of the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) 
v
 Lord Turner, who offered perhaps a more ‘practical’ definition of a bank: ‘if it looks 
like a bank, and quacks like a bank’ then it should be treated as a bank for regulatory 
purposes’ (Turner 2012).  
Historically, many developments can explain the proliferation of diverse corporate 
organisations operating under the umbrella term, bank. The conflicting wishes of countries to 
regulate and control all economic activities within their territories on the one hand, while 
encouraging the internationalisation of trade, investment and business on the other, resulted 
in a somewhat inelegant form of international business activities. While standard economic 
analysis may consider national banks, or Banking Holding Company (BHC) or Financial 
Holding Company (FHC) as interchangeably and as a single economic entity operating under 
one roof and one economic logic, in the real-life business context, the proliferation of entities 
serves a diversity of purposes.  Along the common trends in the corporate world towards 
what Desai (2008) calls ‘the de-centred corporation.’  
 
 
Firms and Corporations  
Demestz (1988) notes that classical economic theory is concerned less with competition, as it 
is often thought, and more with the concept of decentralized order, which it contrasts with the 
familiar order of its day (18
th
 century), a centralized or top-down order. In fact, economics 
never developed a fully-fledged theory of the firm – something that only began with the work 
of Roland Coase (Demestz, 1988). A default position has emerged of the firm as a proxy 
economic actor. The firm is understood accordingly as a profit maximising, shareholder 
utility optimising single entity generating income as a consequence of its financial 
transactions with third parties. The theory assumes that such action takes place under the 
apparently disinterested direction of a board of directors who forego their own personal 
welfare in the interests of the corporation and its owners, to ensure the interests of those 
owners alone.
2
 The key questions driving these studies concern the balance of interests and 
the structure of incentives. How, for instance, to ensure that the agent’s performance and 
interests - either salaried employees in financial services and/or subsidiary branches and 
desks within a banking group - are aligned with the principal’s goals and interests?3  
An institutionalist approach is concerned less with the principal-agent problem and 
more with juridical questions. Jean-Philip Robé maintains that one of the great, and arguably 
most problematic, innovations of Western civilisation has been the concept of the corporate 
legal personality (Robé, 2011). A system of law that had developed to adjudicate among 
people was extended therein to include two types of corporate entities: states and 
corporations. Corporations are licensed by a sovereign corporate body to operate within its 
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 The theory, or variants of it, has been adopted in financial economics (Friedman 1970; 
Jensen 2001; Srivastava et al 1998). In parallel, modern governance literature has focused on 
the so-called principal-agent problem, specifically in the case of finance post-crisis (Chesney 
et al 2010; IMF 2014; Mehran et al 2011; OECD 2009).  
3 The general drift of the discussion that has developed out of this literature suggests that it is 
the incentive structure that may lead to interest alignment (Mehran et al 2011). 
 
territorial boundaries. States insist on full sovereignty over their territories. This means that 
all active economic actors that are located in their territories, whether they are physical 
persons or a corporate personalities (or indeed, every moveable object, including cars, 
airplanes, ships and so on) must be licensed to operate in each and every territorial space they 
wish to operate. Corporations
4
 are therefore legal entities that are licensed by the sovereign to 
operate within the boundary of a specific national space. Those that wish to operate in other 
countries as well must comply with the incorporation rules of host jurisdictions, often 
establishing a local corporation under a separate name (this may assume a variety of forms).   
A Goldman Sachs, therefore, may be a US BHC. But if it wishes to operate in the UK, 
it is required to set up a UK registered company in order to do so. The two companies may 
have close economic relationships between them; the UK entity may be fully or partially 
owned by Goldman US BHC, and the income generated by the UK company may flow fully 
or partially back to the US ‘parent’ company. Yet legally speaking, the two companies can be 
seen as separate entities, dependent on the function and context. One company functions 
under the supervision, laws and taxation rules of the UK, the other under the supervision, 
laws, regulation and taxation of the US.  
In light of the above, Robé (2011) proposes to dwell on the distinction between the 
concept of the corporation and the concept of the firm. The corporation, he suggests, is a 
legal entity that is licensed to operate in a national space. The firm is not a legal entity but the 
economic mechanism that unites co-owned but legally separate corporations. Firms often 
control strings of legal entities or corporations – at time numbered in the thousands – and in 
that sense, they can operate in many jurisdictions or be seen as ‘multinational corporations’. 
But, according to Robe, firms do not have a legal existence, only corporations do. Thus while 
we habitually refer to a ‘multinational corporation’ or a ‘multinational bank’, these terms may 
refer to important economic and even political or social categories, but not to legal entities 
(see McConnachie, 2009). 
 
Table 1 
Number and Distribution of Subsidiaries: Top Seven US Bank Holding Companies 
    Commercial other foreign total Domestic Consolidated 
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 Or companies, different countries use different terminology to describe licensed corporate actors. 
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they MNC exist legally at all. It 
simply provides a history of 
definitions used by others  – 
rather abstract in this sense, 
without an analysis of court 
proceedings etc, and with no  
acknowledgment that in order 
to go into an arbitration case, a 
Goldman Sash will have to 
choose which of the hundreds 






1 JPMorgan Chase & 
Company  
 
4  2,936 451  3,391 86.1 2,265.8 
2 Bank of America 
Corporation   
 
5 1,541  473 2,019  77.9 2,136.6 
3 Citigroup 
Incorporated    
 
2 935  708 1,645  68.8 1,873.9 
4 Wells Fargo & 
Company   
 
5 1,270  91 1,366  92.5 1,313.9 
5 Goldman Sachs 
Group, Incorporated  
 
1 1,444 1,670 3,115 11.2 923.7 
6 MetLife, Inc.  
 
1 39  123 163  3.2 799.6 
7 Morgan Stanley 2  
 
2 1,593 1,289 2,884 10.5 749.9 
Source: (Avraham, et al., 2012) 
Therefore, while firms are primarily identified as economic structures, their legal 
personalities remain a matter of contention  (McConnachie, 2009; Robé, 2011). To put it 
differently, legally speaking, there is no such thing as a ‘multinational corporation’ or a 
multinational bank. Table 1 presents the known distribution of corporate entities of the seven 
largest US BHCs, or US banking ‘firms’ to use Robé’s terminology. To return to our 
example, the Goldman Sachs Group Incorporated consists (in fact, of 3,115 corporate entities 
of which 1,670 are non -US based). Goldman Sachs therefore appears more like an ‘ecology.’   
The  idea that financial structures evolve more like ecologies rather than discreet units 
has attracted attention in light of the 2007-09 (May and Haldane 2009) but given the 
continuing problems of complexity  and scale of modern banks, clearly deserves more 
research. The conventional literature takes it as a given that despite the myriad entities that 
Comment [s3]: Again, much like 
other MNCs 
make up Goldman Sachs or JP Morgan they can be treated as unitary economic actors. But in 
light of the lessons of the crisis and in particular, post-crisis reforms, it is not unreasonable to 
ask whether the different components/entities within competing banks may in fact be 
competing with one another under the common umbrella of an organisation that shares 
elements of a brand name. The LIBOR scandal of 2012 and its echoes, or the rigging of the 
foreign exchange market in the ‘free for all’ culture of five major banks in 20145, suggest that 
certain desks or department within big banks cooperated with trading desks in competing 
institutions to set up their own ‘communities’ and sometimes, working against the purported 
policies of their own companies. Within a bank, different units and groups are competing for 
resources, power and prestige in the organisation (Polillo 2013). Considering the number of 
these diverse legal entities, we suggest that an approach that conceives of such units as an 
ecology may shed light into the behaviour of a complex organisation such as bank that is 
otherwise obscured by the assumptions of unitary approach.  
 In standard economics, the divorce between the legal status of the corporation and 
economic agency of the firm tends to be glossed over, but the divorce between the two may 
help explain some of the semantic ambiguities described above. When the BIS refers to banks 
as a ‘banking organisation’ and as a ‘firm’, the terminology clearly tries to capture a diversity 
of legal entities that are located in different parts of the world. But then, terminological 
ambiguities reflect lack of clarity of the legal status of many of those firms that are supposed 
to be regulated, say, by Basle 3. So whereas the discussion may give the impression of a 
same-like subject ‘banks’ or ‘banking organisations’ or BHCs are being regulated, the reality 
may be that a variety of entities  operate under different legal status and requirements.  
 
Finance as a Complex Economic Habitat   
The ‘ecology’ of banking is particularly significant in light of two important aspects of 
today’s financial system. The first aspect concerns the function and organization of today’s 
finance. While standard theories of finance maintain that the core function of the financial 
sector is to mediate between savers and borrowers, in reality banks and other financial 
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institutions, trading in risk and innovations evolving at the nexus of financial and legal 
techniques, play a vital role in the creation of private credit (Mehrling 2011). 
Second, and importantly, in today’s societies the financial system has become a self-
referential space. The sources of this tangible autonomy lie in the central role that financial 
innovation plays in the contemporary credit system. The propensity of today’s financial 
entities to create credit and thus expand the frontier of private money and hence, purchasing 
power,  points to the role of the process of financial innovation, rather than the positions of 
individual banks and other financial actors, in shaping the very core of banking practice and 
organisation today.   
 Shadow banking is one of the most recent and challenging outcomes of the 
endogenous financial process, and it is here where the ecologies argument meets functional 
theories. A narrow definition of this phenomenon describes shadow banking as constituting 
market-based
6
 (rather than bank-based) ways of funding economic transactions, or, in other 
words, ‘money market funding of capital market lending’ (Mehrling et al. 2013). More 
inclusive definitions suggest that shadow banking is simply ‘credit extension outside of the 
banking system’ (Financial Stability Board 2011). Despite continuing disagreements about 
the definition of shadow banking, there is a broad consensus in the academic and regulatory 
literature that shadow banking has played a major role in the recent crisis, although 
arguments continue as to whether the shadow banking system has played a leading 
(McCulley 2009) or merely an amplifying role in the unfolding crisis (Lysandrou 2012; 
Lysandrou and Nesvetailova 2014).  
Both sides of the debate do acknowledge, however, that the ability to create credit 
‘outside’ the regulated realm of banking has enlarged the de facto size of banks and financial 
institutions. In reality some of the facilities of credit creations outside the banking system 
would turn out to be performed either by entities that are formally or informally part of the 
core BHCs. As a consequence, the ‘shadow banking’ industry is not necessarily a different 
sector, made up of different legal or economic entities, but in fact, a conceptual distinction 
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 Conventional literature in IPE distinguishes between bank-based and market-based financial systems. In a 
bank-based financial system, banks are the key providers of credit and funding to the economy; in a market 
based financial system there is a more competition in the financial system for providers of funds, and in addition 
to banks, economic agents are able to borrow  money or raise funds through various market mechanisms. Hardie 
and Howard (2013) explain that it has been most commonly used to describe the ‘shadow banking system,’ or 
those parts of the financial system that provide credit, but are not commercial banks, such as investment banks, 
money market funds and some of the off balance sheet vehicles made infamous by the crisis (see Adrian and 
Shin 2010).   
that describes a trend that has evolved due to the historical marrying together of various 
trends described above.  
There are three main ways in which this process, largely undetected until 2007–8, has 
affected the financial system. First, the shadow web of financial transactions that connects 
regulated banks – whatever that term may mean -- with a myriad of complex and opaque 
financial and legal structures widens the actual economic size of the bank. Access to market-
based funding and alternative financial channels may help a single institution be more adept 
in a competitive environment, realize economies of scale and manage its risks more 
efficiently. In the context of the system, however, a complex web of undetected financial 
links through the shadow banking system has made individual institutions such as Lehman 
Brothers, Bear Sterns or Northern Rock illiquid and insolvent, putting the financial system as 
a whole on the brink of a collapse.  
Second, shadow banking operations have the capacity to transform a group of 
apparently non-bank financial entities (which may include related entities of some of the 
BHCs in the table above), such as hedge funds, money market funds and special purpose 
vehicles, into a bank-like structure, the financial activity of which is unregulated, lightly 
regulated or simply not accounted for.  For instance, mapping the US financial system, the 
Bank of England admitted in its  2015 study that the value of assets hedge funds in the UK 
(estimated at £670 billion) is  indicative only, based on estimates using a number of data 
sources and assumptions” (BoE 2015: 120, Fig. 4, ft. c).  The Bank has no sector estimates 
for the assets managed by ‘other authorised funds’ ( BoE 2015: p. 120) and notes that ‘while 
the hedge  funds captured in the map are managed from the United Kingdom, the funds 
themselves are typically domiciled overseas’ (BoE, 2015: p. 123, emphasis in the original).  
 Both sets of connections – between the regulated and unregulated segments of finance, 
and within the shadow banking system as such - raise prudential and systemic risk concerns 
from the point of view of financial stability, a matter currently forming a central part of 
attempts to bring about international financial regulatory reform (e.g., Greene and 
Bloomfield, 2013). The size of banks and financial institutions is related to the problem of 
systemic risk and fragility and hence has political ramifications, both overtly and covertly. 
The funding models of ‘official’ banks and other financial institutions relied on complex 
schemes of financial ownership that produced or held financial products or operations that 
could only function as long as the market mechanisms for pricing these instruments 
functioned (Langley 2013).  
Comment [s4]: no: see the FSA – 
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With the onset of the crisis in August 2007, this mechanism seized up and it became 
impossible to price complex financial products or execute individual transactions to get 
access to funding in the wholesale financial market. As a result, the viability of major 
banking and financial institutions came into question. The exposed failures of individual 
institutions pointed to the fragility of the system. The latter in turn, was exacerbated by the 
micro-prudential approach to financial regulation that had been informing national and 
international financial policies up to 2007, most prominently in the Anglo-Saxon countries, 
but also in Europe (Caruana 2009; Freixas et al 2015).  Thus the 2007-09 crisis and its 
aftermath illustrated the costly consequences of overlooking the details of legal and 
functional forms in today’s finance, and of the crucial importance of ‘grey’ areas in financial 
regulation. 
 
Contemporary Scholarship on Complex Finance   
 
In this light, an attempt to define a bank and inquire into its essence as a global entity would 
require a new analytical approach. Such a framework should accommodate a focus on the 
nature of financial interactions, the various inhabitants of the financial system, as well as on 
the outcomes of their interactions.  
Two academic traditions help build such a synthesis. The first originates in the 
emergent field of evolutionary finance. This field recognizes the central role of the apparently 
limitless capacity for innovations in investment styles, products and the regulatory 
framework. Evolutionary finance assumes that the marketplaces for risk-based assets exhibit 
a great degree of dynamism and evolution in the behaviour and interaction of their 
participants. Drawing on several academic currents, evolutionary finance examines the causes 
and effects of the dynamic nature of financial markets through the application of Darwinian 
ideas. While acknowledging that such changes can be traced back to intended outcomes of 
human endeavour, evolutionary scholars recognize that they are caused by the adaptive, self-
organizational and endogenous dynamics of the decisions and interaction of agents in the 
financial market (Evstigneev et al. 2008: 2).  
Within the field of evolutionary finance, agent-based modelling and dynamic models of 
financial markets offer important insights into the choices that financial actors make under 
conditions of uncertainty and nonlinear rationality (for example, Keen 1995; Raberto et al. 
2012; Thurner 2011). In particular, heterogeneous agent modelling (HAM) is an approach 
developed from the 1980s onwards by economists who recognized the bounded (rather than 
the linear) rationality of economic agents and examined their behaviour under conditions of 
uncertainty. Although this perspective builds on the early heterodox economics and advances 
the insights of Keynes and Simon into the role of uncertainty in influencing economic agents, 
new developments in mathematics, physics and computer science in nonlinear dynamics, 
chaos and complex systems motivated economists to develop new models and tools. 
Challenging the traditional representative rational agent framework, heterogeneous agent 
modelling presents finance as a highly nonlinear, adaptive system (Hommes 2006: 1114).  
The second foundation of the emergent synthesis centres more closely on the 
complexity of organization and adaptation, and derives from network theory. Applied to 
banking, the basic premise of this perspective is that today’s credit systems are not only 
composed of a variety of actors (banks, money market mutual funds, investment conduits, 
structured-investment vehicles, hedge funds, broker-dealers, finance companies, and so on), 
but also of a range of credit instruments (wholesale money-market instruments, repos, asset-
backed securities, and so forth) and therefore credit transactions (Guttmann 2003; Guttmann 
and Philon 2010). These transactions necessarily take place in two realms simultaneously – 
legal and financial – and, together, form intricate webs of funding affiliations, intermediation 
and ownership chains. Finance and the credit system, therefore, are webbed as complex 
networks and need to be understood as such. 
 The financial system today, and its embeddedness in the wider political-economic 
context, is defined first and foremost by dynamic interaction between its different inhabitants, 
and the effects (intentional and unintentional) of such interactions on the entities themselves, 
the financial system as a whole, as well as on the ‘outside’ context (politics, society, 
economy, culture, and so on). Yet seeing the banks and the financial system operating in a 
given ‘environment’, as is common in various fields, poses its own epistemological barriers. 
The notion of ‘environment’ implies interaction between entities (traditionally, human and 
other living organisms) with an outside, exterior context.  
 In the wake of the global financial crisis, applications of network theory have become 
common in the discussion of sources of financial instability and, more specifically, in the 
work on systemic risks in finance (Allen et al. 2010; Goldin and Vogel 2010; Haldane 2009; 
Turner 2011). A major conceptual insight here concerns the paradox of integration and 
complexity. Hyman Minsky (1986) famously argued that, in finance, stability breeds 
instability. Network theory complements his insight by describing how too much complexity 
breeds instability and fragility. According to Simon (1962), most complex systems exhibit 
high levels of self-similarity and thus can be simplified for purposes of modelling. Recent 
work in the field of the social studies of finance demonstrates that models used by financial 
agents to capture the complex realities by processes abstraction and simplistic borrowing of 
mathematic approaches from physics (MacKenzie 2006). Being widely used by different 
types of financial institutions, these modules have evolved into an evaluation culture of the 
financial industry, and exercise their own impact on the state of the financial system 
(MacKenzie and Spears 2014: 13). As Goldin and Vogel (2010) argue, the very process of 
simplification is inevitably reductionist and therefore can increase system fragility: 
homogeneity is one of the destabilizing characteristics of complex networks and, in financial 
markets, has been shown to contribute to liquidity crises (Persaud 2008).  
The spread of financial innovations such as credit derivatives and securitization (the 
process of taking an illiquid asset, or group of assets, and through financial engineering 
transforming them into a financial security) has increased the level of complexity and 
integration in finance. At the same time, however, these innovations have also rendered the 
system exposed to targeted attacks on what Goldin and Vogel (2010) call ‘hub nodes’, with 
the potential for risk amplification and contagion. Indeed, securitisation both enhances and 
relies on liquidity. On the one hand, it enhances the liquidity of underlying receivables by 
transforming them into tradable securities, contributing to the perception that, individually, 
financial entities are liquid and financially robust. Yet, on the other hand, the funding of a 
large number of market participants involved in the securitization process critically depends 
on market liquidity being permanently sustained (Bank of France 2008: 2). The homogeneity 
of financial actions of various entities, as well as the very nature of financial liquidity, 
implies that, at the aggregate level, the financial system driven by innovations is becoming 
progressively illiquid (Nesvetailova 2010). In this reading, while it was the sub-prime crisis 
that triggered the financial crisis, it was the underlying innovation, integration and 
interdependency of the global financial network that created the fragility of the system 
(Goldin and Vogel 2010).  
Continuing the analysis of complex networks and drawing especially on the similarities 
with the 1970s scholarship on ecology, Haldane and May (2011) have developed the concept 
of financial ecosystems as a tool to examine the consequences of financial interactions and 
the distribution of risks in the financial system. The authors acknowledge major differences 
between ecosystems that have long existed in the natural world and financial ecosystems that 
are embedded in political and social realms. Today’s ecosystems, they argue, are the 
survivors of long-lasting evolutionary processes, whereas the evolution of the financial 
system is a relatively recent phenomenon. Moreover, in finance, selection is not natural but 
political: ‘in financial ecosystems, evolutionary forces have often been survival of the fattest 
rather than the fittest’ (Haldane and May 2011: 351).  
Yet, notwithstanding these qualifications, the concept of finance as ecology appears to 
be uniquely suited for analysing the dynamics of the complex financial habitat which, 
embedded in the network of shadow banking entities and functions, thrives and transforms 
through innovation. Etymologically, the notion of ‘ecology’ implies no distinction between 
human and non-human, living and non-living nodes within complex networks. As opposed to 
the notion of environment (which living species interact with), ‘ecology’ accommodates the 
connections between entities and their endeavours with non-human ecosystems, as well as 
within the socio-technical networks which underpin the financial industry today. Global 
banks therefore, need to be understood not as unitary economic agents or firms, but as 
corporations accommodating multiple legal personalities across many jurisdictions. 
Regulating these complex structures as unitary entities is bound to be inefficient, as they have  
proven to be able to evolve as complex networks through financial innovation, regulatory 
arbitrage and avoidance. One of the first steps towards a better regulation of global banking 
therefore, would to be acknowledge the gap between economistic approaches to banks and 
financial institutions as firms, and legal approaches to the corporate personalities of banks. 
Evolutionary political economy and ecological approaches to financial dynamics can serve as 
an important step towards such a new understanding.   
 Conclusion 
The lessons of the global financial crisis have produced a paradoxical result. In the wake of 
massive losses, revelations of banking scandals and in light of the emergent literature on  the 
phenomenon of shadow banking, we seem to know a lot about banks today; or at the very 
least, we know more about banks than we did before the 2007-09 crisis. We are broadly 
aware for instance, that banking today has become very complex, organisationally and 
functionally. The largest banks in the world today are known as ‘universal banks’: under one 
roof, they perform several different functions with different asset classes, benefitting from the 
opportunities afforded by the overall size of the group. We also know that a lot of the 
operations conducted by banks today have little to do with credit provision to the economy. 
They are driven instead, by banks’ own incentives cultures (known as commission-based 
banking). Banks have learned to pass on risks associated with the loans they originate to other 
participants of the financial system. And even if the specifics of credit creation and banks’ 
balance sheets  remain too complex for non-specialists (as well as some to experts),  
arguably, we have greater awareness about the importance of banks and banking for the 
economy, and the fragilities associated with many modern banking practices, than we did 
before the summer of 2007.  It is increasingly clear that today’s banking system can hardly be 
analysed with conceptual tools developed for the era of ‘narrow banking’.    
Notwithstanding these insights, it appears to us that even the experts are rather vague 
on the very definition of a bank. Current discussion does not appear to factor in the fact that 
‘banking organisations’ have the technical knowhow, ability and incentives to arbitrate their 
legal status across various jurisdictions in order to benefit from the multiple legal 
personalities that afforded by their corporate structures.  The concept of banking as an 
ecologies is still in its infancy, as is the theory of shadow banking. Yet both phenomena point 
that further research into global banking and finance need to be focused on the interface 
between the legal and functional forms in contemporary financial system, since although a 
distinction between the economic concept of a bank and the legal notion of a corporation and 
their representation may not seem pivotal in the everyday operation of the financial system, 
they become central when questions about the efficacy of global financial regulation, 
financial stability and public policy are raised.  
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i
 The Basle accord of international banking regulations is a set of internationally agrees norms and 
rules that govern internationally active banks across the work. It is named after the town in 
Switzerland, Basle, where the first accord (Basle I) was agreed upon under the framework of the BIS 
in 1982.  
ii
 See 12 U.S. Code Chapter 2 - NATIONAL BANKS  
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/chapter-2), in particular subchapter I, IV and V. 
iii
 United Dominions Trust Ltd v Kirkwood [1966] 2 QB 431 
iv
 See: Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, schedule 2,  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/8/pdfs/ukpga_20000008_en.pdf 
And Banking Act 2009, ‘interpretation of bank’ http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/1/section/2 
v
 The FSA was dissolved in 2013. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) assumed most of the FSA 
functions.  
